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Abstract and Keywords
Hong Kong entered its modern era when it became a British overseas territory in 1841. 
In its early years as a Crown Colony, it suffered from corruption and racial segregation 
but grew rapidly as a free port that supported trade with China. It took about two 
decades before Hong Kong established a genuinely independent judiciary and introduced 
the Cadet Scheme to select and train senior officials, which dramatically improved the 
quality of governance. Until the Pacific War (1941–1945), the colonial government 
focused its attention and resources on the small expatriate community and largely left the 
overwhelming majority of the population, the Chinese community, to manage themselves, 
through voluntary organizations such as the Tung Wah Group of Hospitals.
The 1940s was a watershed decade in Hong Kong’s history. The fall of Hong Kong and 
other European colonies to the Japanese at the start of the Pacific War shattered the 
myth of the superiority of white men and the invincibility of the British Empire. When the 
war ended the British realized that they could not restore the status quo ante. They thus 
put an end to racial segregation, removed the glass ceiling that prevented a Chinese 
person from becoming a Cadet or Administrative Officer or rising to become the Senior 
Member of the Legislative or the Executive Council, and looked into the possibility of 
introducing municipal self-government. The exploration into limited democratization 
ended as the second landmark event unfolded—the success of the Chinese Communist 
Party in taking control of China. This resulted in Hong Kong closing its borders with 
China on a long-term basis and the local Chinese population settling down in the colony, 
where it took on a direction of development distinctly different from that of mainland 
China.
The large influx of refugees to Hong Kong in the late 1940s was transformed by a 
pragmatic colonial administration into a demographic bonus, as all were allowed to work 
freely and become part of the community. Those refugees, particularly from Shanghai, 
who arrived with capital, management knowhow and skills gave some industries, such as 
textile and shipping, a big boost. With the entrepreneurial spirit of the Chinese 
Modern Hong Kong  
Steve Tsang
Subject:  China, Hong Kong, Macao, and/or Taiwan Online Publication Date:  Feb 2017
DOI:  10.1093/acrefore/9780190277727.013.280
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History
Modern Hong Kong
Page 2 of 24
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, ASIAN HISTORY (asianhistory.oxfordre.com). (c) Oxford 
University Press USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see 
applicable Privacy Policy and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: School of Oriental and African Studies; date: 03 April 2017
community unleashed and the colonial administration now devoting most of its resources 
to support them, Hong Kong became an industrial colony and developed increasingly 
strong servicing sectors. By the 1980s, local entrepreneurs had become so successful 
that they took over some of the well-established major British companies that had been 
pillars of the local economy for a century. As Hong Kong developed, it looked to the wider 
world—something originally necessitated by the imposition of trade embargos on China 
by the United States and the United Nations after the start of the Korean War in 1950—
and eventually transformed itself into a global metropolis. In this process, the younger 
generations who grew up after the Sino-British border was closed developed a common 
identity that made them proud citizens of Hong Kong, and they became agents of change 
in reshaping how their parents’ generation felt about Hong Kong and China.
The great transformation of postwar Hong Kong happened in the shadow of a dark cloud 
over its long-term future, which is a legacy from history. Hong Kong in fact consists of 
three parts: the island of Hong Kong, the tip of the Kowloon peninsula, and the New 
Territories, which amounts to 90 percent of the overall territory. The first two were ceded 
by China to Britain in perpetuity, but the New Territories was only leased in 1898 for a 
period of 99 years. As the three parts developed organically they could not be separated. 
During the Pacific War the nationalist government of China successfully secured an 
agreement from the British government that the future of the New Territories would be 
open to negotiation after the defeat of Japan. When victory came, the British recovered 
Hong Kong, and the Chinese government was distracted by the challenges posed by the 
Communist Party. After it won control of mainland China in 1949 the Communist 
government left Hong Kong alone, as it was a highly valuable opening for China to reach 
out beyond the Communist bloc during the Cold War.
In 1979 the British raised the issue of the New Territories lease, as the remainder of the 
lease was getting too short for comfort. Formal negotiations started in 1982, and it took 
two years for an agreement to be reached. The British government ultimately agreed to 
hand over the entirety of Hong Kong as a going concern to China, which undertook to 
maintain the system and way of life there unchanged for fifty years. The transitional 
period saw controversies over democratic developments in Hong Kong, which were 
limited at China’s insistence.
The formal handover went smoothly in 1997, and the colony became a Chinese Special 
Administrative Region. At first it appeared that Hong Kong enjoyed a high degree of 
autonomy, as promised by the Chinese government, but the scope for its autonomy was 
eroded gradually. The increase in interactions between the local people and the mainland 
Chinese, as well as the Chinese authorities’ refusal to let Hong Kong develop genuine 
democracy, nurtured a strong sense of Hong Kong identity, which started to transform 
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into a kind of national identity that is different and distinct from that of China. By the 
mid-2010s this gave rise to a small but vocal movement that advocates independence.
Keywords: Anglo-Chinese relations, anti-corruption, Chinese irredentism, colonialism, democratization,
development, governance, identity, one country two systems, post-colonial development
Early Years as a British Colony
Modern Hong Kong was the product of the First Anglo-Chinese War (1839–1842), 
popularly known as the “First Opium War.” While dispute over British export of Indian 
opium to China was the immediate trigger for hostilities, the war was long in the making. 
Having defeated Napoleon Bonaparte and emerged as the leading imperial power and 
economic powerhouse, Britain under Queen Victoria requested and required the Qing (or 
Manchu) Empire in China to receive its envoys without performing the kowtow and to 
trade openly, which the latter refused as it did not consider Britain or any power its 
equal. The Qing government’s destruction of British-owned opium stored in Guangzhou 
(Canton) merely provided the casus belli for war. In the Treaty of Nanking Britain forced 
the Qing Empire to accept British diplomatic representation and cession of Hong Kong 
Island in perpetuity and thus secured one of the best natural harbors on the China coast 
to support its trade with China. Hong Kong was transformed from a cluster of fishing 
villages of several thousand people or, in the graphic though exaggerated description of 
Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston, a “barren island with hardly a house upon it” into a 
British imperial outpost, a naval station, and a free port. Hong Kong entered its modern 
era.
A Crown Colony system was put in place, by which the governor served as both the 
representative of the queen and the chief executive, supported by an appointed 
Legislative Council constituted by Britons, an Executive Council, and a separate 
judiciary.  While the judiciary was meant to be independent, this did not materialize until 
a decade later, after Hong Kong attracted sufficient lawyers to staff the judiciary without 
also simultaneously serving in the executive branch or practicing law commercially.  A 
Crown Colony is an authoritarian system with checks applied largely through the British 
Parliament, until it starts a process to introduce representative government that usually 
ends in independence.
Early colonial Hong Kong suffered from racial segregation and discrimination, as well as 
corruption and incompetent governance as very few well educated individuals settled 
there. Nevertheless, stability, order, and opportunities in this British enclave attracted 
Chinese immigrants who fled abusive governance, disorder caused by massive rebellions, 
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and limited economic opportunities at home. Even as the British expatriate community 
doubled in size repeatedly, Chinese immigrants constituted over 95 percent of the 
population and contributed more to growth and government revenue than the expanding 
British expatriate community. Reflecting the bias and practice in the British Empire at 
the time, the colonial government devoted its attention and resources overwhelmingly to 
the tiny expatriate community and largely left the Chinese or “native” population to 
manage themselves through voluntary organizations such as the Tung Wah Group of 
Hospitals. This continued through the 19th century as both communities preferred to 
minimize inter-communal exchanges. The Chinese did not find British racial 
discrimination particularly objectionable as most of them hardly ever came into contact 
with a Caucasian, and their homeland, China, was itself under the rule of the alien 
Manchus until 1912.
Major improvements to governance happened in the 1860s, after the colonial government 
introduced the Hong Kong Cadetship, a scheme for recruiting “young graduates from 
Britain to receive intensive training in Cantonese [the local lingua franca] and written 
Chinese for two years, before deploying them on a fast track in the civil service.”  Its 
success “effectively laid the foundation for a modern civil service based on merit” and put 
an end to corruption at the senior level.  The size of the government and its elite corps of 
Cadet Officers remained small as the administration continued to take a light touch 
approach to governance. In the postwar period Cadet Officers became Administrative 
Officers, but they continued to constitute the elite and occupy top offices.
After a haphazard start colonial Hong Kong flourished, but it was overshadowed by 
Shanghai as the latter developed at a much faster pace in the late 19th and early 20th 
century. Hong Kong only became a more modern and sophisticated metropolis than 
Shanghai after the Communists came to power in China in 1949. Until then the 
population of Hong Kong was constituted more by sojourners than settlers, as few Britons 
settled there on a permanent basis, and the Chinese immigrants moved freely across the 
border with China. The most settled population tended to be Eurasians, Macanese 
(Portuguese from neighboring Macau), a small number of British subjects from other 
parts of the Empire, and an unknown percentage of Cantonese who did not seek to retire 
to their home villages in China. Among the last group, traders, shop owners, and 
investors were generally more settled than laborers. A distinctive Hong Kong identity in 
the sense of one that can underpin nationhood did not develop until toward the end of 
British rule. But the Chinese community that was settled, and in particular its well-off 
elements, did develop a sense that they were a special category of Chinese, one that 
distinguished them from their compatriots in China.
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Cradle of Chinese Progressive or Revolutionary 
Movements
For all the shortcomings of colonial life, Hong Kong developed a relatively efficient, 
effective, honest, and fair administration, particularly in contrast to what prevailed in 
neighboring China in its “century of humiliation.” It was a small British enclave, albeit 
one populated mostly by Chinese, and its everyday life had a predominantly Chinese 
flavor. British administration, rule of law, municipal services, and individual freedom 
were there for all to see and enjoy. This made Hong Kong an inspiration for those 
Chinese interested to learn about alternative political models and ideas to that prevailing 
in their home country. From the first generation of republican revolutionaries to 
dissidents in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), they have found Hong Kong a source 
of inspiration. Sun Yat-sen, leader of China’s republican revolution of 1911, admitted that 
he first developed the idea for the revolution when he studied at the Medical College, 
predecessor to the University of Hong Kong.
As a British colony, Hong Kong was outside Chinese jurisdiction and thus served as a safe 
haven for revolutionaries and other critics of the government of China. In general terms 
the British authorities turned a blind eye to Chinese intellectuals and activists defying the 
government of the day in China as long as British laws were not broken. But the colonial 
administration did not allow Chinese activists to use Hong Kong to subvert the 
government of China, from the Qing through the Republican to the Communist period.  In 
practice the republican revolutionaries used Hong Kong as they surreptitiously plotted 
against the Qing government, the Communists used it against the Republican 
government, and many who escaped Communist rule sought sanctuary and safety in 
Hong Kong after 1949. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) notably maintained a major 
communication and control center there to coordinate activities in southern China before 
it seized control of China.  It continued to maintain a secret party branch in Hong Kong 
even after 1949, under the public guise of the New China News Agency. The party 
branch’s existence was known to the Hong Kong government, which tolerated it and only 
acted against specific members of the CCP when they broke the law, as some did after 
the Maoist Cultural Revolution spilled over and became what was known locally as “the 
confrontation” of 1967.
What colonial Hong Kong offered Chinese dissidents and progressive intellectuals was 
ready access to Western ideas and scope to debate them freely, witness a British 
administration in action, and benefit from the rule of law without traveling to Europe. 
Hong Kong did not support revolutionary activities directed against the Chinese 
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government, but it provided safety and inspiration to Chinese dissidents pondering what 
alternative political systems might suit China.
Expansion and the Beginning of the End
Hong Kong consists of three parts: the main island that formed the original colony, the tip 
of the Kowloon peninsula on the northern side of the Victoria Harbour opposite the main 
island, and the much larger landmass north of Kowloon, up to the Shenzhen River in 
Guangdong province, known as the New Territories. Britain acquired Kowloon in 
perpetuity in 1860 after defeating the Qing government a second time. The New 
Territories, about 90 percent of the total territory, was leased for 99 years in the
Convention of Peking (1898). The British took out a lease against the background of a 
“scramble for concessions” in China by the great powers following Qing’s defeat by Japan 
over Korea in 1895, which raised the prospect that China could be carved up by the 
imperialist powers. Since Britain held the lion’s share of trade and investments in China, 
its access to the whole country would suffer should China be partitioned. Thus, when 
France seized control of the port of Guangzhouwan (now Zhanjiang), about 210 miles 
from Hong Kong, Britain enlarged the colony to make it defensible against a long-
standing European competitor. However, it was weary of setting off a scramble for 
territorial cession and thus only leased the New Territories for a limited duration. With 
Victorian Britain at the zenith of its power, little thought was given to the long-term 
implications, such as the eventual expiration of the lease.
British jurisdiction over the New Territories was established by a Royal Order in Council, 
which was scheduled to expire three days prior to the end of the lease on June 30, 1997. 
It unwittingly laid down a termination date to Hong Kong’s existence as a British colony. 
The future of Hong Kong proper and the New Territories became inseparable as the 
whole territory developed and integrated organically. By the early 20th century the old 
boundary had become two sides of a main road (the Boundary Street) with 
indistinguishable shops and residential dwellings on both sides. As time went on, with 
basic infrastructures like the airport and major reservoirs in the leased territory, it 
became increasingly unrealistic for Britain to hold on to Hong Kong and Kowloon without 
the New Territories, even though the British Crown held title to the former two in 
perpetuity.
A small number of British officials started to query the wisdom of not converting the lease 
into permanent cession a decade after the event, but the British Government did not see 
a challenge to the lease for half a century. It was during the course of the Second World 
War that this became an issue. As Britain and China became allies, China’s wartime 
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leader Chiang Kai-shek asked for the return of the New Territories as part of a deal to 
end extraterritorial rights Britain had secured in China in the 19th century.  Although 
Chiang only asked for the early termination of the lease, Britain had no illusion that what 
was at stake was the future of Hong Kong as a whole. The pressure Britain faced was 
considerable, as Hong Kong fell to the Japanese in 1941 and was geographically within 
the China Theater for which the allied commander was Chiang. The outcome of the 
wartime negotiations was that the Chinese government reserved the right to raise with 
Britain the lease of the New Territories after the defeat of Japan.
The British government calculated that if Hong Kong should be liberated by Chinese 
forces at the end of the war, the prospect of getting the Chinese units to leave and return 
Hong Kong to British jurisdiction would be very poor. Consequently, a British fleet raced 
against a Chinese army and restored British sovereignty over Hong Kong when Japan 
surrendered in August 1945.
Impact of Japanese Occupation
Hong Kong came under Japanese occupation in December 1941, after Japan attacked 
Pearl Harbor and various Western colonies in Asia. Japan’s humbling of European 
imperial power in Southeast Asia was a historical turning point. It destroyed the myth of 
the invincibility of the white men and their empires. Much as the brutality of Japanese 
occupation provoked resentment in colonial Asia, initial Japanese military successes 
fundamentally changed the relationship between the colonial people of Asia and their 
Western imperial masters. The clock could not be turned back. A wind of change blew 
across colonial Asia at the end of the war. For the first time in Hong Kong’s history, the 
local Chinese residents no longer tolerated racial discrimination unquestioningly.
Senior officials restoring British rule to Hong Kong were conscious of the changed 
environment and tried to deliver a new deal, partly to pre-empt local support for an 
expected demand from Chiang to end the New Territories lease.  The pre-war legislation 
that prohibited Chinese from residing in designated areas was quickly repealed. Having 
been imprisoned by the Japanese, the pre-war governor Mark Young, a progressive and 
reflective official, took the lead to make changes after he resumed office in 1946. Young 
sought to engage the local population in a step-by-step program to introduce 
representative government. He drew up a plan to introduce a super municipal council 
with elective elements to develop a sense of local identity and loyalty to British Hong 
Kong. Ironically, London’s recognition of the need for change meant it only gave “old-
timer” Young one year to restore the honor of the British military and replaced him by a 
younger and “more forward looking” successor before he could put his plan into action.
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Young’s successor was former cadet Alexander Grantham, who left Hong Kong a decade 
earlier and rose rapidly in Jamaica, Nigeria, and Fuji. Not having experienced firsthand 
Japan’s triumph over the British Empire in Asia and how this raised expectations among 
the local Chinese, Grantham did not agree with Young’s priorities. Assuming the 
governorship in 1947 he focused on the changing relationship between Hong Kong and 
China, where a civil war raged. As the Communists won control of mainland China in 
1949, Hong Kong was swamped with refugees escaping Communist rule. Grantham 
seized the moment when the local people were thus distracted and ended Young’s 
promise of reform. He did so because he considered Young misguided in thinking his 
reforms could convert Chinese sojourners into loyal British subjects.  Grantham’s priority 
was to deliver good governance to all residents, and he worked on the assumption that 
Hong Kong would be reintegrated into the Chinese province of Guangdong eventually.
Making of a Global Metropolis
Postwar Hong Kong developed at a pace and in a direction unimaginable before the 
Japanese invasion. The coming to power of the Communists in China brought about 
fundamental changes. Previously Hong Kong’s population fluctuated as Chinese people 
freely moved in and out, depending on stability and order in China on the one hand and 
the availability of opportunities in Hong Kong on the other. The population in the 1930s 
generally hovered between nine hundred thousand and a million, but it increased 
significantly after Japan invaded China in 1937 and pushed the total to over 1.6 million 
before the Japanese attack in 1941.  During their occupation, the Japanese forcefully 
pushed the population out and reduced it to less than six hundred thousand in 1945. 
While much of the prewar population returned after the restoration of British rule, an 
influx of refugees pushed Hong Kong’s population to nearly 2.3 million in 1950.  As the 
British realized that Communist rule would become entrenched in China and the flood of 
refugees would continue, they closed the border with China. From this point onward, the 
Chinese population of Hong Kong became a settled one. It also grew exponentially, rising 
by a million in each of the following three decades and reaching 7.3 million in 2015. This 
required the government and the population to adjust in ways not attempted before.
The slow but steady erosion of the inward-looking colonial establishment that hitherto 
discouraged the local Chinese from making the most of Hong Kong’s facilities in 
government and banking services helped Hong Kong to turn a refugee crisis into a 
demographic bonus. Apart from starting massive programs to house the refugees and 
provide basic health care and education, the colonial government gave free rein to 
Chinese entrepreneurship and allowed all refugees to work. The government also 
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engaged with the local Chinese and reduced bureaucracy for securing government 
approval for industrial or business purposes. What emerged gradually was a “positive 
non-intervention” policy, by which the government encouraged and nurtured 
entrepreneurship without interfering directly into the market, providing subsidy, or 
picking champions.
Hong Kong did have significant manufacturing and other industries before the Japanese 
invasion, but the influx of refugees from Shanghai brought capital and technical and 
management knowhow that speeded up industrialization, particularly in the textile 
sector.  From around 1950 to the 1970s, Hong Kong transformed itself into a vibrant 
manufacturing center with light industries contributing to an increasing share of growth 
and employment.  What really drove the process was the entrepreneurial spirit and 
acumen of Chinese industrialists. Many adeptly shifted into completely different lines of 
manufacturing as demands, almost all external, changed over the years. The 
transformation of Li Ka-shing from plastic flower manufacturer to real estate tycoon to 
the all-around most successful local entrepreneur shows how this worked at its best.
Trade expanded as Hong Kong made the most of its geographical location and free port 
status. Its future as an entrepôt for trade with China was threatened when the United 
Nations and the United States of America imposed embargoes against the PRC after the 
latter militarily intervened in the Korean War in 1950. The colonial government met this 
challenge and maintained the entrepôt trade for non-strategic goods between the PRC 
and the world outside of the socialist bloc by issuing certificates of origin for locally 
manufactured goods made from imported Chinese raw material, and promoted trade by 
setting up a trade development council. The China trade expanded exponentially after the 
PRC opened up in the post-Mao era.  Ultimately it was the local Chinese business people 
who took risks and responded adroitly to opportunities that made Hong Kong a 
manufacturing and trading power house. By 1980 local Chinese entrepreneurs had 
managed to outcompete and in some cases even take over old British trading houses that 
had been pillars of Hong Kong’s economy in the previous century.
The expansion of the servicing sector benefited from the economic take-off following 
rapid industrialization, which increased the need for shipping, financial, and professional 
services, as well as from the emergence of a consumer society as disposable income rose. 
The shipping industry benefited from the influx of Shanghainese refugees whose 
investments eventually ended the long-established British domination and made the 
industry more competitive. By taking advantage of its stability, good order, independent 
judiciary, and welcoming environment to international investment, Hong Kong developed 
a modern and well-connected financial services sector. It also welcomed newer financial 
services such as fund management.  Since the 1970s, expansion of the servicing sector 
enabled it to compete and surpass the industrial sector as a driver for growth. This partly 
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reflected an increase in local consumption, as the refugees of the past had mostly become 
economically active workers and consumers. The opening up of China after 1978 led to 
local entrepreneurs making the most of the comparative advantages by transferring 
labor-intensive industries to China and focusing on the servicing industries. Increasing 
investments in infrastructure further improved Hong Kong’s capacity to integrate with 
the global economy. Collectively they enabled Hong Kong to become a global financial 
center behind New York and London, making it a global metropolis.
Best Possible Government in the Chinese 
Tradition
By the early 1980s, Hong Kong reached a landmark. It delivered the best possible 
government in the Chinese tradition—“one which is efficient, fair, honest and 
paternalistic, but at the same time non-intrusive into the lives of the ordinary people.”
The meeting of these criteria has to be assessed against the context by which the people 
of Hong Kong measured local governance—what happened in China.
The requirement of efficient government has arguably been met by the Hong Kong 
government since the end of the 19th century, as local expectation was low in an era 
when governance in China was poor and ineffective. Although the colonial government 
did not provide excellent municipal services, they exceeded the expectation of the local 
Chinese. The key demands of the local residents were the maintenance of stability and 
good order, which the colonial government provided efficiently. The context changed 
after the Second World War. The near-totalitarian rule of the CCP in China under Mao 
Zedong undoubtedly surpassed the colonial government in efficiency. But it also brought 
about disasters such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. In contrast, 
the Hong Kong government steadily increased and improved the provision of municipal 
services, from public sanitation to health services to educational provisions. It also made 
itself accessible and responsive to the general public by introducing City District Officers 
and other consultative mechanisms. Notwithstanding many shortcomings from which the 
government still suffered, by the end of the 1970s it consistently enjoyed very high public 
approval which indicated it had met the criterion.
The meeting of the fairness criterion relied heavily on the establishment of the 
independence of the judiciary, which was dramatically demonstrated in the “poisoned 
bread case” of 1857. In the course of hostilities between Britain and China that 
eventually resulted in the cession of Kowloon in 1860, a local bakery supplied the 
expatriate community with bread laced with arsenic, which poisoned most members of 
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this community, including the wife of the governor, though no fatality resulted. The 
bakery owner Cheong Ahlum was put on trial. Even though all members of the jury were 
victims of the poisoning, Cheong was acquitted.  This was an unusual case, but what was 
on trial was not just Cheong but the reputation of British justice. Such a case did not 
remove racial discrimination, but it dramatically highlighted how much fairer British 
justice was compared to what prevailed in China. The end of legal segregation after the 
Second World War, and the steady removal of the color bar, demonstrated by the 
appointment of Chau Tsun-nin as the Senior Unofficial Member of the Legislative Council 
in 1950 and of the Executive Council in 1953, started the process to enable Hong Kong to 
meet the fairness requirement.
The honesty requirement was only met after the Independent Commission Against 
Corruption (ICAC) successfully ended syndicated corruption in the 1970s. Bureaucratic 
corruption bedeviled the government, but it was largely kept to the junior ranks between 
the early 1860s and the immediate postwar period. This happened because the upper and 
the lower echelons of the government were separated by the British class barrier, with 
the upper echelon drawn from the middle classes and above, well remunerated, and 
beyond the reach of the poorly paid functionaries. After the class barrier was removed as 
part of the progressive postwar reforms, corrupt junior officers did not cease to take 
bribes after they rose to senior positions. Corruption creeped upward. This applied not 
exclusively but most spectacularly to the police. When Commander of the Kowloon 
District Peter Godber, among the first who broke the class barrier, escaped to Britain 
after he came under investigation for corruption, it provoked a huge public uproar. 
Governor Murray MacLehose responded by establishing the ICAC in 1974, which 
successfully extradited Godber to face trail and a jail sentence. This started the process 
by which the government successfully persuaded the general public that it would not 
tolerate corruption and established an honest reputation by the end of the 1970s.
The last criterion—non-intrusive paternalism—was also met around the same time. The 
colonial government was non-intrusive to its Chinese residents most of the time even in 
the 19th century, as it largely left the Chinese to their own devices. This neglect 
gradually developed into a practice of the government minimizing intrusion into the 
everyday life of the general public. Paternalism implies a government that looks after its 
citizens. This criterion was met slowly in the postwar era. Even though the government 
had a policy of not providing a social safety net, as revenue rose it increasingly provided 
support for those in need, first by building low-cost housing and nearly free universal 
health care. The public commitment, again during MacLehose’s governorship (1971–
1982), to a ten-year housing scheme, free universal education, and the Public Assistance 
Scheme finally enabled the government to meet the non-intrusive paternalism criterion.
25
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The meeting of these criteria did not make Hong Kong a democracy. The authoritarian 
Crown Colony system continued until the end of the British rule in 1997, but by the 1980s 
the government had made itself responsive to public opinion without the formal 
institutional structure of a responsible government. As Hong Kong residents came to 
desire democracy, eventually meeting the criteria of the best possible government in the 
Chinese tradition was no longer sufficient.
Sino-British Negotiations and Retrocession
Even though the British government prepared itself for a Chinese demand to negotiate 
the future of the New Territories after the defeat of Japan, such a demand did not 
materialize as Chiang Kai-shek was preoccupied with the Chinese Civil War. When they 
came to power the Communists put the matter aside, as they knew time was on their side 
and Hong Kong was highly valuable for access to the outside world.
The subject was finally raised by the British after a pragmatic government led by Deng 
Xiaoping ended the tumultuous Maoist era in China. In 1979 Governor MacLehose took 
advantage of an official visit to ascertain if Beijing might agree to fudge the expiration 
date of the New Territories lease and allow the British to continue to govern Hong Kong 
in return for Hong Kong’s continued functioning as the goose that laid golden eggs for 
China.  Deng’s view was that “a negotiated settlement of the Hong Kong question in the 
future should be based on the premise that the territory is part of China,” adding that 
Beijing would “treat Hong Kong as a special region.”  Until this British initiative the 
Chinese government had focused on how Hong Kong could help with Deng’s reforms.  It 
finally decided at a Politburo meeting in March 1981 to recover Hong Kong in 1997 and 
adopted the “one country, two systems” formula for this purpose.
Formal negotiations started when British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher visited China 
in September 1982. Thatcher’s starting point was that Britain would only negotiate about 
the leased territory. The Chinese position was that all three parts of Hong Kong must be 
returned and the negotiations could only be about how to ensure Hong Kong’s retention 
of its prosperity and stability.  The negotiations were difficult, and the people of Hong 
Kong were not allowed a direct say. It took two years to reach an agreement for Hong 
Kong to be made into a Chinese Special Administrative Region (SAR) in 1997. While the 
general framework for the Sino-British Agreement (1984) was based on the “one country, 
two systems” idea, the specifics for Hong Kong to enjoy “a high degree of autonomy” 
under Chinese sovereignty were elaborated in Annex I of the document. They reflected 
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the input of British negotiators who tried to secure a deal for Hong Kong to maintain the 
existing political system and way of life for the following fifty years.
The commitments the Chinese government had made, detailed in Annex I, were 
incorporated into the SAR constitution, the Hong Kong Basic Law. This document was 
promulgated by the Chinese National People’s Congress in 1990, after an extended 
period of drafting and consultation that lasted nearly five years. This process paralleled a 
British attempt to introduce a representative government to Hong Kong. This reflected a 
difference in the interpretation of the commitment to uphold Hong Kong’s way of life. The 
people of Hong Kong and the British government worked on the assumption that Hong 
Kong would continue to develop organically until 1997, and the status quo then would be 
maintained for half a century. In contrast, the PRC government insisted that it would only 
uphold the status quo in place as of 1984 and refused to allow Hong Kong to 
democratize.
In reality the Chinese policy was less unyielding than its rhetoric, and it was one of 
exercising maximum flexibility within a rigid framework.  The rigid framework was about 
upholding the PRC’s sovereignty over Hong Kong and maintaining CCP rule in China as a 
whole. Within this framework, the PRC was prepared to exercise as much flexibility as it 
deemed appropriate to ensure Hong Kong’s continued flourishing and contribution to 
China’s development. The precise meaning of this changes as circumstances evolve.
Between the signing of the Agreement in 1984 and the handover in 1997, a significant 
element of the Hong Kong citizenry desired as much democratization as possible, seeing 
democracy as a bulwark against Communist intervention post-1997. The Hong Kong 
government shared this view and published a green paper for developing representative 
government for consultation quickly. But Hong Kong significantly pulled back after 
Beijing publicly opposed its plans.  A fresh attempt to revive the democratization project 
modestly was made in 1992, when former Cabinet Minister Christopher Patten took on 
the governorship in the aftermath of “the Tiananmen Incident,” the large-scale military 
crackdown on peaceful demonstrators in Beijing in 1989.  Patten sought to strike a 
balance between reassuring the people of Hong Kong, who had become deeply worried 
about their future, and not breaching Beijing’s bottom line in not allowing full direct 
election based on universal suffrage. Beijing misunderstood and over-estimated the scale 
of Patten’s plan and threatened to dismantle whatever reforms he might put in place.  In 
the end, Patten proceeded with his very limited reform, which did not turn Hong Kong 
into a democracy. Beijing reversed Patten’s reforms when it took over, but it kept a small 
number of individuals previously appointed to the Executive Council by Patten to assuage 
public opinion in Hong Kong.  This showed the extent and the limits of “the maximum 
flexibility within a rigid framework” policy.
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Rise of a Local Identity
The closing of the border with China in 1950 was a key development that led to the 
eventual rise of a national identity in Hong Kong. As free movement of Chinese persons 
across the border ended, the population settled down and took on a developmental path 
distinctly different from that of China under Mao Zedong. People born and bred in Hong 
Kong lacked ready access to the PRC. They developed a common identity by sharing a 
capitalist approach to development, a British-style education, and a way of life based on 
modernization of the Confucian culture. They came of age in the 1960s and considered 
themselves citizens of the territory. The spillover of the Cultural Revolution forced them 
and their parents to choose between supporting the Maoist rioters or the colonial regime 
that provided the sociopolitical framework for them to flourish. The younger generation 
led their parents to embrace the colonial administration as their government. This helped 
to forge an imagined community, one which the colonial government seized upon to make 
changes that resulted in it meeting the criteria of the best possible government in the 
Chinese tradition a decade later. As Hong Kong citizens put the turmoil of 1967 behind 
them, they developed a vibrant and lively popular culture based on the Cantonese 
language.  “The Hong Kong identity that emerged was based on a shared outlook and a 
common popular culture which blended traditional Chinese culture with that imported 
from overseas, with the influences of the USA, Britain and Japan being particularly 
noticeable. This shared outlook incorporated elements of the traditional Confucian moral 
code and emphasis on the family, as well as modern concepts like the rule of law,” 
respect for human rights, a limited government, “a free economy, a go-getting attitude 
and pride in the local community’s collective rejection of corruption.”
Post-Cultural Revolution changes and the end of Maoist isolationism in China complicated 
the emergence of a Hong Kong national identity, however. As China opened up in the 
1970s and the first “China fever” developed, Hong Kong’s young people became intensely 
proud of their Chinese-ness. The reaching of the Sino-British agreement further required 
them to reconcile their new sense of identity with the reality that their future lay inside 
China. Thus, their sense of identity in the run-up to 1997 was a somewhat convoluted 
one, as they felt they were both Hong Kongese and Chinese at the same time, though 
they felt they were a special kind of Chinese, distinct from their compatriots in the PRC.
The end of British colonial rule led many to want to identify more with a proud Chinese 
nation. However, as Beijing entrenched its anti-democratic consultative Leninist system 
and adamantly refused to let Hong Kong progress meaningfully in the direction of 
democratization,  it caused enormous disappointment and frustration. The younger 
generations, who grew up without living through the fear associated with the Tiananmen 
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massacre of 1989, came to see themselves as different from the mainland Chinese. As 
they saw their core values—democracy, human rights, and the rule of law—come under 
pressure from mainland China, they viewed the relationship with the mainland in terms of 
“righteous us” versus “unscrupulous them.” This sentiment gradually metamorphosed 
into a kind of national identity, one that for the first time underpins an emerging demand 
for independence from the PRC.
Special Administrative Region
Hong Kong formally became a Chinese SAR on July 1, 1997. The British handed over an 
effective government that continued to function as previously. Since the 1950s the 
colonial administration had asserted so much autonomy that officials in the Colonial 
Office in London informally nicknamed it “the Republic of Hong Kong.” This hands-off 
approach was reaffirmed by the British government after reaching the Sino-British 
Agreement in order to put Hong Kong in the best possible position to enjoy a high degree 
of autonomy under Chinese sovereignty.
In its early years as a SAR, Hong Kong appeared to enjoy a high degree of autonomy as 
Beijing tried to avoid interfering into its domestic affairs.  It happened despite the 
Leninist nature of the PRC system, as successive chief executives of the SAR routinely 
second-guessed and avoided policies that Beijing would not like. While this approach 
minimized Chinese interference, it did not maximize autonomy. Given that Hong Kong’s 
political system is meant to protect individual freedom, human rights, and judicial 
independence, allowing it to enjoy a high degree of autonomy within the wider 
consultative Leninist system dedicated to sustaining the dominance of the CCP, tension is 
inherent. To maximize autonomy, it is necessary for the SAR to develop a dynamic with 
the Chinese state that allows the two sides to test but not cross each other’s bottom lines. 
In reality, the chief executives’ devotion to second-guessing Beijing has resulted in a 
steady erosion of the SAR’s autonomy, as the SAR government never tests Beijing’s 
bottom line, while Beijing gets more restrictive.
In its first decade as a SAR, the people of Hong Kong generally accepted this approach, 
as the erosion of autonomy was not readily noticeable, and the PRC government was very 
supportive of Hong Kong during the Asian financial crisis, which hit just after the 
handover. As the economy came under pressure the SAR government chose the easy 
option, which was to rely on Chinese support to ride out the crisis. This process was not 
reversed later, and Hong Kong’s economy became increasingly dependent on the Chinese 
economy. As China’s economy took off and became the world’s second largest by the 
2010s, Hong Kong’s relative importance declined. When China committed itself to the 
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“one country, two systems” policy in the 1980s, Hong Kong was indispensable to its 
economic development. In the early 21st century, while the SAR remains a significant 
economic partner to Beijing, it is arguably no longer indispensable.
The frustration that an increasing element of Hong Kong’s population, particularly its 
younger members, felt toward the incompetence of Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying and 
the constraints on democratization imposed by Beijing resulted in major social protests in 
2014. The crux of the matter was that while Hong Kong, particularly its younger 
generations, wanted to elect its chief executive directly by 2017, the Chinese government 
only allowed it to elect its chief executive after candidates had been screened and 
approved by Beijing.  This conflict came to a head in autumn 2014 when a modest group 
of Occupy Central activists organized a demonstration, which the police met with tear gas 
and pepper spray. This use of force contradicted the tradition of non-violent policing 
established since the 1980s and provoked a large-scale public outcry, transforming a 
modest demonstration into a major protest movement. The protestors used umbrellas to 
protect themselves against tear gas and pepper spray, and the events, which lasted from 
September to December, came to be called the umbrella protests.
The umbrella protests reflected a wider and growing resentment in Hong Kong against 
the way Beijing and mainland Chinese deal with Hong Kong. As the PRC and its citizens 
grew rich, they subscribed to the Chinese government narrative of the superiority of the 
consultative Leninist system and flaunted their newfound wealth in Hong Kong, behaving 
as if anything and anyone has a price. This made many people in Hong Kong feel their 
core values—human rights, rule of law, democracy, rejection of corruption, and civility—
which underpin their sense of identity were coming under attack from Beijing and the 
mainlanders. They have increasingly come to see their relationship with Beijing as a 
colonial one and to reject it. This has given rise to some activists of the younger 
generations agitating for independence which, in turn, has caused serious concern in 
Beijing. With its government under a hard-line leader, President Xi Jinping, Beijing sees 
“the localists” in Hong Kong as posing a challenge to the unity of China and the political 
dominance of the CCP, and takes a carefully calibrated but increasingly repressive 
approach to the SAR. While the umbrella protests lost steam by the end of 2014, the 
underlying tension and problems remain. A few activists built on their activism to gain 
election to the Legislative Council in autumn 2016. The refusal of some of them to take 
the oath of loyalty in accordance with the rules gave Beijing an excuse to interpret the 
Basic Law in a way that prevented the activists from taking office.
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Discussion of the Literature
General readers looking for a well-written short introduction should start with John 
Carroll’s A Concise History of Hong Kong (2007). Someone looking for more depth, detail, 
and insight into what shaped British Hong Kong will best be served by Steve Tsang’s A 
Modern History of Hong Kong (2004). Both are balanced and solidly based.
With the end of British colonial rule, Hong Kong should have become a post-colonial 
society sharing many commonalities with other Asian states that emerged from European 
imperialism, including an attempt to de-emphasize the contributions of the colonial power 
and a shift in focus to the contributions of the local people. In Hong Kong the opposite 
happened in the first decade or so after the end of British colonialism. A number of 
former colonial officials published memoirs to explain their work and experience.  The 
appearance of these memoirs reflects the existence of a nostalgia for the British period 
and the reality that the usual process of decolonization has not happened. Hong Kong did 
not achieve independence, and its people were not allowed to determine their own future. 
As Hong Kong became a Chinese SAR, the promise that the political system and way of 
life it inherited from the British would be sustained for fifty years meant that its future 
remained beholden to its past, and the narrative of Hong Kong’s history is something its 
new consultative Leninist sovereign feels it should control.
Looking at Hong Kong’s change of status in 1997 dispassionately, an obvious 
interpretation is that the British colony of Hong Kong was transformed into a PRC colony. 
This would explain the nostalgia for the British period. Be that as it may, describing the 
SAR as a Chinese colony is politically incorrect—indeed, it is unacceptable to the PRC 
government. This affects how Hong Kong is treated in the literature. No academic work 
written originally in Chinese takes such an interpretation. Even works in the English 
language generally avoid addressing such a reading of the situation.
The political sensitivity of Hong Kong’s status as a Chinese SAR also affects how its 
democracy and democratization are examined in the literature, even in English. While 
most works follow the standard definition of democracy and democratization and 
conclude that Hong Kong faces severe challenges, an alternative approach has emerged. 
Sonny Lo, a long-standing specialist on Hong Kong politics, now describes Hong Kong’s 
political system as a kind of “indigenous democracy.”  This is an interesting and 
potentially significant development, as the interpretation of “indigenous democracy” 
resembles closely the Chinese establishment’s view of itself as having met Hong Kong’s 
democratic aspiration. There is a rising demand in Hong Kong for its citizens to elect the 
chief executive democratically by 2017. Lo dismisses this demand and essentially agrees 
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with the Chinese government that it has fulfilled its promise of democratization by letting 
the people of Hong Kong elect the chief executive from among candidates already vetted 
and approved by the PRC.  An important question is whether Lo’s book, Hong Kong’s 
Indigenous Democracy: Origins, Evolution and Contentions (2015) is an outlier or a 
harbinger of a new body of literature that will fall in line with the views of the Chinese 
authorities.
The unusual status of Hong Kong since 1997 also poses a problem for dealing with the 
issue of identity. Is Hong Kong Chinese? What does Chinese-ness mean in the context of 
Hong Kong, in the British period and the SAR period? If being Chinese in Hong Kong 
means something different from being Chinese in the rest of the PRC, will it make better 
sense to use a different term to describe it, for the sake of intellectual clarity? David 
Faure has reflected insightfully on the meaning of being Chinese in Hong Kong,  but 
whether the special characteristics of the Hong Kong identity are sufficient to justify it 
being described otherwise than as Chinese is a politically charged issue. A Hong Kong 
scholar who argues that Hong Kong is too distinct from mainland China to be deemed 
Chinese is at risk of being labeled a traitor.
Primary Sources
The most important primary sources for the study of Hong Kong are the archives of the 
Hong Kong government and of the British government. While all the archives at the 
Public Records Office in Hong Kong are obviously relevant, there are several collections 
at the British National Archives which are particularly important. The most basic are the 
records of the Colonial Office, particularly series CO19, CO129, CO131, CO537, CO825, 
CO882, and CO1030. The Foreign Office archives are also exceptionally rich in material 
relevant to Hong Kong’s history, most notably FO17, FO228, FO371, and FCO40. The 
other departmental series of archival sources that are most valuable are CAB23, CAB65, 
CAB128, and CAB129 of the Cabinet Office; and DEFE6 and HS1 of the Ministry of 
Defence. The listing of the National Archives series is selective rather than exhaustive.
Apart from the official archives, there are important collections of primary sources and 
research collections on Hong Kong. Among them, the Hung On-To Memorial Library at 
the University of Hong Kong Library houses the largest collection of research material, 
including some private papers of individuals who made significant contribution to Hong 
Kong. The archives of the Tung Wah Hospitals, available through the Tung Wah Hospital 
Group in Hong Kong, are highly valuable in shedding light on how the local Chinese 
community managed its own affairs during the British colonial period.
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Another major depository of private papers and oral archives of individuals who served in 
the Hong Kong government and the public sector is the Weston Library at Oxford 
University. The collections there were built up mainly as the manuscript collections of the 
Rhodes House Library, which has been merged into the Weston Library. They include 
substantial collections of papers of individuals such as former governors Frederick 
Lugard and Cecil Clementi, former Colonial Secretary Franklin Gimson, and former 
Secretary of State for the Colonies Arthur Creech-Jones, as well as the papers of the 
Fabian Society. In addition, there is a significant body of oral records (generally available 
in transcript if no longer subject to time-bans) of senior officials and non-official leaders, 
such as governors Murray MacLehose, David Trench, and Robert Black; Chief Justice 
Denys Roberts; and Senior Member of the Executive Council Sze-yuen Chung. They also 
include many lesser senior officials in many different departments of the Hong Kong 
government. The longest of the transcripts, at 967 pages, is that of David Jordan, former 
director of commerce and industry. This collection of interview records is particularly 
useful for insights on how Hong Kong was governed in the postwar period and on the 
early 1980s negotiations for the future of Hong Kong. Before they were transferred to the 
Weston Library in 2014, the records were housed as the Hong Kong Collection at the 
Rhodes House Library.
For those unable to access the archives, there is the series Documentary History of Hong 
Kong published by the Hong Kong University Press. It consists of three volumes and 
provides annotated introductions to the most important documents on the politics, 
economy, and society of Hong Kong. The three volumes are Government and Politics
(edited by Steve Tsang); Society (edited by David Faure); and Economy (edited by David 
Faure and Lee Pui-tak). There are also memoirs of colonial officials and critics that give 
personal accounts of their experiences, including Alexander Grantham, Via Ports: From 
Hong Kong to Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012); Trevor Clark,
Good Second Class (Stanhope, UK: The Memoir Club, 2004); and Eric Peter Ho, Times of 
Change: A Memoir of Hong Kong’s Governance 1950–1991 (Leiden, The Netherlands: 
Brill, 2005). Elsie Tu’s Colonial Hong Kong in the Eyes of Elsie Tu (Hong Kong: Hong 
Kong University Press, 2003) gives the perspective of a long-standing critic of the 
colonial administration.
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